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1. Introduction 
Franchising is an increasingly popular form of organization, both in the U.S. 
and overseas. Nevertheless, most research work has been done in the U.S. 
and in the fast food sector. Since the 1980s major importance in the growth 
of franchising systems can be attributed to the advent of a new governance 
form due to multi unit franchising. The strength of franchising is seen in its 
ability to reduce agency problems because franchisees become residual 
claimants on the profits of their units operated. Within this view, multi unit 
franchising can be interpreted as an anomaly to agency arguments. In a multi 
unit agreement a franchisee is permitted the right to establish a mini chain of 
outlets within the franchise system. Employee store-managers are operating 
these mini chains under the control of the multi unit franchisee.1
This work tries to explain the situation and use of multi unit franchising in the 
German franchise sector with the aim to enable cross country comparisons of 
this governance form. Compared to the U.S. market franchising in Germany 
is a relatively young phenomenon which started to emerge in the 1960s. But 
since then franchising could register a continuous growth on Germany’s 
economic landscape. With this underlying study I want to shed light on a 
franchisor’s tendency to use multi unit franchising over single unit franchising 
as an ownership strategy in franchise systems in Germany. The underlying 
premises to explain the use of this ownership strategy are based on agency 
theory and transaction cost theory explanations.  
  
The study can be divided into two parts. First I am going to explain the 
theoretical framework underlying this research work. The construct of 
franchising will be presented and its emergence in Germany. Agency and 
transaction cost theory arguments for franchising will be described. A 
summary of the empirical literature will give a review on research work on 
multi unit franchising over the last decades. In part two the hypotheses will be 
formulated before discussing the empirical results obtained by the data. The 
conclusion remark will shortly recapitulate the paper and finally, an outlook 
on possible future research work will be proposed. 
                                            
1 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
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2. Franchising 
2.1. Traditional and Business-Format Franchising2
Franchising has become a part of everyday life for most consumers today, 
not only in the U.S. but worldwide. The answer that franchising has become 
so ubiquitous seems to lie apparently in the capacity combining the chain’s 
comparative advantages in creating brand recognition and capturing 
economies of scale with the entrepreneur’s local knowledge and drive. An 
ideal franchise relationship will represent a situation in which each party is 
able to specialize in what each one does best and yet benefit from the efforts 
of the other.  
In the U.S., the Department of Commerce historically has distinguished two 
separate types of franchised relationships: traditional franchising and 
business-format franchising. Traditional franchising is also called product or 
trade name franchising. Traditional franchising can be traced back in the U.S. 
at least to the mid-1800s when the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company 
and the Singer Sewing Machines Company sold their products through sales 
agents who were given exclusive sales territories. With some years in 
business both companies found they needed more control over their sales 
agents if they were to protect their respective reputations and brands. The 
McCormick Company responded by establishing company-owned branch 
houses throughout the U.S. and Canada. McCormick was able to 
systematize procedures and communications with its agents. As for the 
Singer Company, it addressed the need for control by converting many of the 
independent agencies into company outlets. An important development was 
the creation of a series of recommendations by the Singer Company which it 
handed out to the remaining agents as to how the offices should be run and, 
for the first time, they required detailed financial reporting from these agents.  
Traditional franchising today is comprised largely of automobile dealer-ships, 
gasoline service stations, and soft-drink bottlers. Characterizing for this type 
of franchising is that the franchisor is a manufacturer who sells finished or 
semi-finished products to its franchisees who resell these products to 
consumers or other firms in the distribution chain. 
 
                                            
2 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 5-8  
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The main difference between traditional and business-format franchising is 
constituted by the additional knowledge the franchisor is offering to its 
franchisees. A business-format franchise does not only include the product, 
service, and trademark of the franchisor but the entire business format itself. 
That comprises a marketing strategy and plan, operating manuals and 
standards, quality control, and continuing two-way communication. The 
franchise is identified by its trademark, product or service and method of 
operation that is monitored and controlled by the franchisor.3 In the U.S. the 
growth in business-format franchising was highly visible in the 1960s, mostly 
in the restaurant or fast-food industry. During the 1970s other sectors as well 
started to make use of this business format and highest growth levels were 
achieved in the sectors business aids and services and automotive products 
and services. Further development and franchise growth continued in the 
service sector, in areas such as day-care facilities, maid services or both eat-
in and take-out restaurants.4
2.2. Franchising in Germany
 
5
While franchising in the U.S. has a long tradition, in Germany its rising 
importance began in the middle of the 20th Century. But since then it 
experienced a steady upswing and in the meanwhile constitutes the fastest 
growing form of organization and modern form of self-employment. The first 
franchise systems which fall under the category of business format 
franchising, originated in Germany in the mid-sixties. In 1965, the fast-food 
chain Wimpy, as first foreign franchise in the German market, opened its first 
branch in Germany.
 
6
Between 1996 and 2006 franchising in Germany could register a growth rate 
of 11% p.a., due primarily to the low starting base. The number of franchisors 
increased 5% p.a. and the number of franchisees per franchisor in 2006 
averaged around 60 compared with 40 in 1996. In the time frame from 2004 
and 2006 the sector’s average growth rate of 15% p.a. was significantly 
  
                                            
3 see Weaven and Frazer (2003) 
4 see Lafontaine (1992) 
5 see Deutsche Bank Research (2008) 
6 see Steiff (2004), p.10 
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faster than that of the economy as a whole. The most important sectors 
franchising systems are dominated by in Germany are the service, the 
hospitality, retail trade and skilled trades sector. Opportunities for new 
franchise systems are expected to be located in the health, education and 
environment and energy sectors.7
Table 1 gives an overview of the franchise economy’s development over the 
last ten years in Germany and Figure 1 describes the distribution of sectors 
in franchising.  
  
Table 1 German Franchise Business  
 2000 2010 Growth 
Employees 346.500 463.000 +33.6% 
Franchisees 37.100 65.500 +76.5% 
Franchisors 735 980 +33.4% 
Sales (bn. Euro) 22 55 +150% 
(Source: DFV – German Franchise Association | 
www.franchiseverband.com) 
  
                                            
7  see Deutsche Bank Research (2008)  
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Figure 1 Sector Distribution  
 
Source: DFV – German Franchise Association | www.franchiseverband.com 
 
2.3. The nature of franchising 
The essential economic rationale for franchising is that it enables the 
involved parties to achieve whatever benefits of large scale may be available, 
for example, brand name development and organizational design, while 
capitalizing on the profit incentive and retailing effort of local franchisees.8 
The franchise literature offers a wide range of definitions of the franchise 
agreement. All of these definitions have in common the following features:9
1. A franchise involves a contractual relationship between the parties under 
which one party (the franchisor) licenses the other party (the franchisee) to 
carry on business under a name, owned or associated with the franchisor; 
2. Control by the franchisor over the way in which the franchisee carries on 
that business; 
 
 
                                            
8 see Klein (1995) 
9 see Adams and Jones (1997), p. 22 
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3. Provision of assistance to the franchisee by the franchisor in running the 
business; 
4. The businesses are however separate: the franchisee provides and risks 
his own capital.  
 
In short, a franchise agreement can be described as a contractual 
arrangement between two legally independent firms in which a firm, the 
franchisee, pays the parent organization, the franchisor, for the right to sell 
the franchisor’s product and/or right to use its trademarks and business 
format in a given location for a specified period of time.10 Additionally, the 
franchisee usually agrees to adhere to franchisor requirements considering 
the product mix, operating procedures or quality.11 Franchising is a significant 
alternative to both non-integration and full vertical integration because it 
offers more control than market exchange and simultaneously avoids some 
of the negative effects of full integration.12 A criterion of interest to define the 
existence of a franchising relationship seems to lie in the exclusivity that 
implies that kind of agreement. Exclusivity created through the fact that the 
franchise arrangement concentrates on one company’s product line and 
consequently identifies to some extent the business with that company.13 
In a franchise agreement a franchisor benefits from the dedication and 
energy of an individual, the franchisee, who is building a business for himself. 
This motivation of the franchisee is a main reason for the franchisor to use 
franchising to begin with which helps the franchisors to secure its profits in 
the long run better than with company-owned outlets. In traditional business 
format franchising, the franchisor retains similar controls over the franchised 
outlet, as over a managed outlet. The franchisee-owned outlet is a kind of 
managed outlet to the franchisor in which the franchisee risks its capital. This 
risk bearing by the franchisee differs substantially from other governance 
organizational forms.14
                                            
10 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 3 
 The risk of capital is in itself a control devise. 
11 see Shane (1996) 
12 see Norton (1988) 
13 see Klein (1995) 
14 see Norton (1988) 
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Employee managers do face no such risk. Because company managers are 
no residual claimants of the profits generated at their outlet they have lower 
incentives to work hard and make their outlet a success.15 
For the franchisee, franchising is offering the great advantage of shelter 
behind the umbrella of a large organisation compared to starting a new 
business entirely on his own. Following the statement “Be in business for 
yourself, but not by yourself.”16 Franchisors typically offer managerial 
assistance to the franchisee like training programs, standard operating 
procedures or advertising.17 The arrangement can benefit all parties when 
working properly. The franchisor gets a better return because the franchisee, 
whose capital is at risk, works hard to make a success of the business. The 
franchisee gets a high return on his capital with lower risks and difficulties 
involved in operating independently.18 
Although offering a lot of advantages for both sides, franchisor and 
franchisee, franchising arrangements are not free of incentive alignment 
problems. These exist because of goal conflicts between the two parties. All 
that is necessary for a malincentive problem to exist is that the franchisee 
controls to a certain degree inputs that can influence the demand for the 
franchisor’s product, such as marketing effort. Further the franchisor sells its 
product to its franchisee at a price that is greater than its marginal cost. This 
underlies the assumption that the franchise agreement consists of a 
franchisor selling a product to franchisees who then sell it on to the 
consumer.19 Therefore the continuing control over the franchisee’s behaviour 
and its way of operating the business by the franchisor is a very important 
feature of the franchise arrangement. The object of the franchisor’s 
monitoring is to preserve strict uniformity between outlets, and to enable to 
preserve and enhance the goodwill associated with the franchisor’s name 
and trademark.20
                                            
15 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 134 
 Typically the strength of franchise systems does not only lie 
in the absolute quality of the products offered but also a very large 
percentage of success resides in the capacity of the franchise system to offer 
16 see Grünhagen und Mittelstaedt (2000) 
17 see Norton (1988) 
18 see Adams and Jones (1997), p. 7 
19 see Klein (1995) 
20 see Adams and Jones (1997), p. 21 
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a uniform product or service at a reasonable price. Customers know what to 
expect when they visit regularly an outlet in a franchised chain, and it is 
important for the system to successfully meet these expectations time after 
time. It is the consistency of the system’s operation, service, and product 
quality that attracts customers and results in loyalty.21 Apart from attracting 
customers and further customer loyalty, uniformity leads to other several 
advantages. First, uniform operations across outlets imply the opportunities 
for economies of scale in procurement and marketing. Second, uniform 
operations make it easier and less expensive to develop and introduce new 
procedures and products. Finally, uniformity facilitates comparisons across 
outlets’ performances and thereby reduces learning and monitoring costs.22
2.4. Why to franchise? 
 
This makes it especially important to align the incentives of franchisor and 
franchisee. 
Most of theoretical explanations for franchising have been developed on the 
concept of single franchisor - franchisee pairs. Factors that have emerged to 
explain the use of franchising include risk, moral hazard as well on the 
franchisee’s side as on the part of the franchisor, the franchisor’s need for 
capital, and information asymmetries on either the agent’s or the principal’s 
side. The traditional explanation for franchising is presented by the capital 
constraint argument, displaying a situation in which the franchisor, facing a 
binding capital constraint, uses franchising to overcome it.23
                                            
21 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 117 
 But difficulties 
arise with this theoretical concept. Franchising being based on this 
assumption should imply a reduced reliance on this business format as the 
franchisor’s business matures and gains access to capital. As a 
consequence a trend toward company-owned outlets should be observed. 
This development could not be established empirically. A further argument 
that weakens the capital constraint explanation comes along with the fact that 
franchisors often provide financing to their franchisees. These franchisors do 
22 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 119 
23 see Lafontaine (1992) 
 
 
Page 9 of 54 
 
not support the assumption that they use franchising as a source of capital.24 
Other theoretical inquiries see franchising as an institutional arrangement 
that circumvents the entrepreneurial capacity problem. The entrepreneurial 
capacity focuses on the resources and constraints facing the entrepreneur. A 
crucial variable is how much time an entrepreneur has to invest to monitor 
the performance of its business inputs like labour, capital or raw materials. 
An entrepreneur’s monitoring time limits therefore firm growth and size. 
Parameters that affect an entrepreneur’s time allocation can be labour 
intensity, the value of factors of production and spatial dispersion. 
Franchising should occur where the entrepreneurial capacity constraint is 
binding, caused by high monitoring costs of hired factors or supervisors.25 
Franchising, thus, becomes a means to mitigate malincentives between 
franchisors and franchisees and consequently the need to monitor. A firm’s 
emphasis on franchising used as expansion strategy has a significant, 
positive effect on its growth and survival.26
                                            
24 see Lafontaine (1992) 
 By replacing a company 
employee as a salaried outlet manager with a franchisee as a residual 
claimant on the profits of the franchise unit, franchising reduces problems in 
selecting, assimilating and monitoring new employees. Hybrid organizational 
arrangements, like franchising, reduce adverse selection as firms grow. 
Researchers argue that franchising as an organisational form will have a 
positive consequence on a firm’s survival because it allows a faster 
development of economies of scale and thereby higher competitiveness. 
Previous research on organizational choice supports the perspective that 
franchising represents an efficient method for firms to acquire capital, whilst 
minimizing monitoring expenditures through improving the alignment of 
franchisor and franchisee incentive structures. U.S. research assumes that in 
practice few firms follow a pure franchising strategy. Most often franchise 
networks are characterised by hybridized organizational arrangements and 
plural forms, the simultaneous use of franchised and company owned units. 
An explanation for the usage may be their ability to balance the competing 
demands of system standardization and system-wide adaptation to 
25 see Norton (1988) 
26 see Shane (1996) 
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competition. New information and opportunities within local markets can be 
possessed through franchisees, whereas company owned units might offer 
the franchisor a means to assess best practices and maintain consistency 
across other units within the system.27 The stronger a common brand name 
the more benefits a franchisee can obtain by belonging to this franchise 
system, but the higher might be his incentive to profit from free riding. As a 
consequence, franchisors with a valuable brand name may be obliged to 
operate more company owned outlets to exercise more direct managerial 
control over downstream operations. On the other hand a franchise 
agreement constrains the franchisors to offer an ongoing support to their 
franchisees like effort in advertising and promoting the brand to sustain the 
long-term profitability of the chain. A way to give them the needed incentives 
to fulfil their tasks is to have them operate more outlets directly.28 However, 
recent studies suggest that systems adopting a franchising strategy are more 
likely to promote higher growth rates than systems maintaining a mix of 
franchised and company-owned units.29
2.4.1. Agency Theory Arguments for Franchising 
 
In contrast to the transaction cost theory, the focus of the agency theory is to 
solve the pre-contract incentive problems between the parties. With an 
efficient incentive system the foreseeable ex ante incentive problems should 
be solved, especially the problems which are caused by the agent’s 
opportunistic behavior. Since it is supposed that, after the contract is settled, 
no surprises may arise, in the sense of unpredictable events, agency theory 
assumes complete contracts. The settlement of agreements is not 
expounded.30
Researchers have focused on the incentives of employee unit-managers to 
misrepresent their capability and their effort as the main motivation behind 
franchising. This employee’s behaviour causes costs and inefficiencies on 
the franchisor’s chain. Arguing that franchising solves this problem by 
 
                                            
27 see Weaven and Herington (2007) 
28 see Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) 
29 see Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) 
30 see Kleine (1996) 
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installing franchisees as the residual claimants of the profits at the store level 
has shifted the attention of researchers to this incentive-based rationale 
argument.31
”The domain of agency theory is relationships that mirror the basic agency 
structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative 
behaviour, but have differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk”.
  
32 For 
instance, while franchisees are interested in achieving short-term profits, 
franchisors are more concerned about strengthening the brand equity of their 
systems.33 Agency theory asserts that when a firm franchises by doing so 
minimizes agency costs via the best available alignment between outlet 
managers’ incentives and firms’ objectives. Thus, the basic agency argument 
is that franchising reduces monitoring effort by offering the franchisee an 
incentive contract that aligns the franchisee’s interests with that of the 
franchisor.34
The principal delegates work to the agent facing the problem that their 
interests diverge and that this situation gives incentives to the agent to 
misrepresent its skills and effort. The misrepresentation of skills is known as 
the adverse selection problem whereas the misleading effort represents the 
so called moral hazard problem. The problem of adverse selection emerges 
as potential new employees differ in their capabilities. Entrepreneurs have to 
face the uncertainty about their qualities as entrepreneurs seek to select and 
hire more qualified employees. This preference of qualified employees 
creates an incentive for less qualified applicants to misrepresent their abilities 
to obtain employment. Another possible incidence of adverse selection 
comes with the different desirability of jobs available within the organization. 
New employees prefer the employment that leaves them with the highest 
risk-adjusted compensation relative to the demanded effort. To avoid 
mismatches between jobs and abilities the entrepreneur has to incur costs in 
gathering information to determine which tasks are appropriate to which new 
employee. Agency theory argues that these problems can be circumvented 
  
                                            
31 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
32 see Eisenhardt (1989), cited in Garg and Rasheed (2003) 
33 see Dant and Nasr (1998) 
34 see see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
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by either residual claimancy, or monitoring. Monitoring stands for the desire 
of the principal to increase the amount of information about the agent’s 
behaviour. Which solution is superior depends on the cost of monitoring 
employees relative to the expenses of building a franchise system.35
When the costs of direct monitoring of employee managers are high, the 
ownership incentive accompanying franchising becomes quite attractive.
  
36 
One of the most frequently studied factors to use franchising over firm 
ownership, because of reduced monitoring expenses, is geographic 
dispersion.37 Therefore, franchising has become a response to agency 
problems associated with the geographic dispersion of units in a retail 
chain.38 Prior research has identified two important conditions that augment 
direct monitoring costs. First, the distance monitoring personnel must travel 
to control an outlet, second, the needed knowledge about local market 
characteristics to properly evaluate managers.39 This situation is perhaps 
most pronounced within firms that seek for foreign expansion.40 The 
expectation that geographical dispersion has an effect on franchising is 
assumed to be greater for multinational franchisors as they cross 
international borders and expand further than among regions of the domestic 
market.41
Residual claimancy as a further way to solve agency problems is to replace 
wage contracts with hybrid organizational arrangements likes franchising that 
provide residual claimancy to unit managers. In franchising, qualified 
individuals can signal their capabilities by buying outlets. By running a 
franchise unit the franchisee agrees to be compensated by the uncertain 
claim on the profits of that store. High qualification and hard work will provide 
the franchisee with a better return than the average salaries paid to an 
employee. The other way round less qualified individuals will not be able to 
exhaust the full potential of an outlet which will end up in a lower 
 
                                            
35 see Shane (1996) 
36 see Combs and Ketchen (1999) 
37 see Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis (2006) 
38 see Caves and Murphy (1976) 
39 see Combs and Ketchen (1999) 
40 see Lafontaine (1992) 
41 see Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis (2006) 
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compensation from residual claimancy than the average wage rate. The 
positive effect for the franchisor comes along with the reduced cost of 
determining the capabilities of outlet managers which simultaneously lowers 
the cost of firm growth.42 Franchising also helps to reduce attitudes of moral 
hazard. Researchers distinguish two types of moral hazard. First, suboptimal 
effort and, second, misdirected effort. Franchising does not reduce the 
problem of misdirected effort. The situation that a franchisee free-rides on the 
chain’s brand name or franchisees that lower the quality of output to reduce 
their costs and increase their profits in the short-term, since they are unlikely 
to lose sales if other units follow through with obligations. They can benefit 
from spill over effects of other hard working franchisees.43 But franchisees as 
residual claimants have reduced incentives to put forth a suboptimal effort 
level. Since suboptimal effort is unobservable but misdirected effort can be 
observed and punished and is less costly to monitor, franchising reduces the 
rate at which monitoring costs must rise as a firm grows.44 Moreover, a 
franchisee operating a unit risks substantially more by being detected to shirk 
because the franchising contract can be terminated in the event of the breach 
of the contract. Consequently, franchising makes it possible to establish 
larger systems without facing the high monitoring costs of large firms that do 
not franchise.45
2.4.2. Transaction Cost Arguments for Franchising 
 
The important difference between agency and transaction cost approaches is 
that the former involves an analysis of individual motivation whereas the 
latter situates the individual in a wider institutional framework which allows 
the firm to be analysed as an organisational entity. Pre-given technologically 
separable units are posited.46 Exchange between these units must be 
organised and regulated.47
                                            
42 see Shane (1996) 
 The principal dimensions on which transaction 
cost economics presently lie for purposes of describing transactions are the 
frequency with which they recur, the degree and type of uncertainty to which 
43 see Cochet, Dormann and Ehrmann (2008) 
44 see Shane (1996) 
45 see Garg and Rasheed (2003) 
46 see Williamson (1985) 
47 see Dietrich (1994), p. 3 
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they are subject, and the condition of asset specificity. When the 
enforcement of contractual arrangements cannot be relied upon in the 
market, different degrees of forward integration are feasible alternatives. The 
basic premise of transaction cost analysis is that the firm will internalize 
activities that it can perform at lower costs and will choose the market for 
activities in which other providers have an advantage. The transaction cost 
framework relies upon strong behavioural reality.48
Transaction costs are defined as the costs of governing the system. Ex ante 
transaction costs are the costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding the 
agreement. Ex post transaction costs include, first, the maladaption costs 
incurred if transactions drift out of alignment with requirements, second, the 
haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post 
alignments, third, the set up and running costs associated with the 
governance structures to which the disputes are referred, and, finally, the 
bonding costs of effecting secure commitments.
  
49 Transactions are very 
difficult to measure because they stand for potential consequences of 
alternative decisions.50 Transaction costs are almost never measured directly 
but tested if the organizational relations align with the attributes of 
transactions as predicted by transaction cost reasoning.51 Transaction costs 
tend to be low in highly competitive markets and market exchange is a widely 
used means. In contrast, when the market is unable to impose behavioural 
constraints and enforce simple contracts, firms are expected to internalize 
transactions to reduce costs of exchange. However, transaction costs are 
also present within the firms itself. Williamson (1975) observes that 
hierarchies do not fully eliminate transaction costs. When the cost of 
organizing the same transactions within the firm or across the market is the 
same, no further internalization will occur. In this way the transaction costs, 
markets and hierarchies scenario can explain both hierarchies and markets 
in terms of transaction costs economizing.52
                                            
48 see Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) 
 
49 see Dietrich (1994), p. 21 
50 see Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) 
51 see Williamson (1985) 
52 see Williamson (1975), cited in Pitelis (1993), p. 11 
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Williamson (1975) explained transaction costs in terms of human and 
environmental factors. These factors are bounded rationality, more precisely, 
limits in the acquisition and processing of information, opportunism through 
self-interest seeking behaviour of the parties and asset specificity, the 
investment on specific assets by agents, which tends to lock them into 
transactions by generating sunk costs and thus high costs of exit. If bounded 
rationality, asset specificity and opportunism coexist together in any 
transactional situation, the effective operation of the market mechanism may 
be impeded.53 According to Simon (1957) economic actors are “intendedly 
rational, but only limitedly so”. Individuals, or groups of individuals, have 
inevitable limits on their abilities to process or use information that is 
available. This implies that economic actors are inevitably faced with 
incomplete information, i.e. informational uncertainty exists.54
Asset specificity is the extent to which specialized investments are needed to 
support an exchange, the degree to which durable human or physical assets 
are locked into a particular trading relationship, and hence the extent to 
which they have value in alternative activities.
 Imperfect, or 
asymmetric, information may give raise to opportunistic behaviour through 
the involved actors that will try to exploit advantages and cheat the opposing 
party.  
55 Such investment has the 
effect that a large-numbers bargaining situation, with a lot of intermediaries 
available, becomes a small-numbers situation.56 The non redeployable 
specific asset makes it costly to switch to a new relationship and the market 
safeguard against opportunism is no longer effective.57
Uncertainty reflects the ability to predict relevant contingencies, internal as 
well as external to the firm.
  
58
                                            
53 see Williamson (1975), cited in Pitelis (1993), p. 10 
 External uncertainty allows the development of 
negative information asymmetries and further opportunistic behaviour. 
Different facets of external uncertainty may lead to either a motivation to 
reduce transaction costs or a desire for flexibility. External uncertainty may 
54 see Dietrich (1994), p. 19 
55 see Dietrich (1994), p. 21 
56 see Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) 
57 see John and Weitz (1988)  
58 see Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) 
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be presented by the two dimensions of volatility and diversity. Volatility refers 
to the extent to which the environment changes rapidly and makes it difficult 
to predict future outcomes which cause problems in contract implementation 
because these agreements will be incomplete. An environment with high 
diversity confronts the firm with high heterogeneity, many customers, many 
competitors and a multiplicity of demands. A desire for higher flexibility 
urges.59
Given the existence of contracting problems, the occurrence of the above 
three factors, transaction cost economics claims to be able to specify the 
governance structure that can efficiently manage economic activity in any 
situation.
 
60
Governance structures frequently serve as vehicles for the appropriation of 
quasi-rent. The transactions considered by transaction cost economics 
usually demand prior investments in specialized physical or human capital. 
Since such assets cannot easily be transferred to other uses once they are in 
place, the revenues generated by production typically exceed the sum of the 
ex post opportunity costs facing input suppliers. Those governance structures 
that enable essential input suppliers to appropriate large ex post quasi-rent 
streams will thrive.
 However, according to Williamson (1975), if any of the three 
conditions is absent, then the market mechanism will still operate effectively.  
61 Transaction costs not only make the firm necessary but 
also shape the nature of the contracts used within the firm and limit the size 
and scope of the firm.62 Franchise contracts may be designed to assure 
performance in a very different way, doing this by facilitating a self-
enforcement mechanism. Court-enforced contact terms operate in this 
context by creating sufficient franchisee rents so that the threat of termination 
of the relationship by the franchisor gives the franchisee sufficient incentive 
to supply the desired behaviour and inputs.63
                                            
59 see Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) 
 Franchisors expect franchisees 
to make significant commitments, e.g., when franchisees invest in outlet-
specific assets, such as unique building designs. These specific assets are 
60 see Dietrich (1994), p. 22 
61 see Dow, G.K. (1993), p. 101-102 
62 see Brown (1998) 
63 see Klein (1995) 
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an important source of leverage allowing franchisors to ensure ongoing 
cooperation from franchisees and have a positive effect on a firm’s decision 
to expand through franchising. Asset specificity bonds a franchisee to the 
franchising contract. Franchisors have an incentive not to expose their 
specific assets, such as brand name capital, to contractual governance 
unless franchisees are adequately bonded.64
3. Types of Multi Unit Franchising
 
65
The key difficulty with much of the existing literature is that it tends not to 
distinguish between different forms of franchising. Thus the decision to 
franchise is considered as binary, and the complexity of different franchise 
arrangements largely ignored.
 
66 The literature implicitly or explicitly assumes 
that franchisees are owners of single units.67 While many franchisees are 
indeed small business owners with just one outlet, it is important to realize 
that most franchised chains also include a number of franchisee-owned “mini 
chains”.68 “The typical location-based franchise system (of which the fast food 
franchise is the prime and model example) is populated with multi unit 
franchisees.”69 
The difference between single unit franchising and multi unit franchising lies 
in the number of outlets operated by a franchisee. Multi unit franchising refers 
to an arrangement in which the franchisee is permitted to own more than one 
unit. Bradach’s (1995) statement presents a multi unit franchisee as a 
franchisee who owns several outlets building a mini chain within the franchise 
system. A mini chain can be described as multiple outlets owned by the 
franchisee and operated by employee-managers of the franchisee.  
Three distinct types of multi unit franchising have been categorised by 
researchers, namely, master franchising (or sub franchising), area 
development and area representative (sequential multi unit franchising) 
agreements.70
                                            
64 see Combs and Ketchen (1999) 
 The most common way to apply multi unit expansion is 
65 see Grünhagen und Mittelstaedt (2000) 
66 see Watson et. al (2007) 
67 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
68 see Bradach (1995), cited by Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 49 
69 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
70 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
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performed through sequential acquisition of franchised units. A sequential 
multi unit franchising agreement grants the franchisee the right to buy 
additional units after having been able to demonstrate that he can efficiently 
run his current unit or set of units. Typically each subsequent unit is governed 
by a separate franchise contract. The franchisor, with that kind of 
arrangement, uses the granting of additional units as a reward for high-
performing franchisees and, hence, creates an incentive mechanism as 
well.71 Franchisees are granted “the right to expand”.72
                                            
71 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 50 
 The expansion 
process for the sequential multi unit franchisee is mostly a slower one.  
The second way to become a multiple-unit owner is with an area 
development agreement. The franchisee, as an area developer, agrees to a 
contractual obligation to open a prespecified number of units within a 
specified period of time. Contracts underlying area development agreements 
force area developers to approach their assigned territory in a systematic 
fashion and therefore resulting in an accelerated growth process. 
Franchisees working as area developers generally operate in a specified 
territory, which is defined in the franchise contract. Area development 
agreements have to be distinguished from sub franchising. An area 
development agreement directly grants the franchisee the right to establish 
and operate its units. Sub franchising is widely used in the international 
expansion efforts of franchisors. Domestically, however, sub franchising 
plays a subordinate role compared to sequential multi unit and area 
development franchising which represent a more “direct” relationship 
constellation between franchisor and franchisee. A sub franchising 
agreement implements an additional layer of management with the sub 
franchisor who is granted the right to find the franchisees to develop a 
territory and to contract with them. The difference lies within that the sub 
franchisor holds the permission to grant others the right to set up and 
manage franchise units in the specified territory. This represents a shifting of 
vertical management responsibility that makes the original franchisor more 
dependent on multiple unit operation managers and may reduce operational 
72 see Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) 
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performance.73 Confusion may arise from the fact that both types of 
agreements are sometimes called master franchising.74
4. Single Unit Franchising versus Multi Unit Franchising 
 
4.1. An empirical literature review 
The decisions that franchisors make suggest that their goal is to minimize 
unit costs, as multi unit owners are given control over sets of outlets that are 
close to each other so they are easy to travel between and oversee, but at 
the same time minimize competition and conflict among franchisees.75 
Theoretically, multi unit franchising states a governance choice approach to 
system growth that contradicts those efficiencies sought by conventional 
business format franchisors who aim at maintaining consistency and 
compliance within their system. A multiple unit franchisee represents an 
additional layer of management which employs store level managers to run 
its units.76 This appears to create inefficiencies through severing the linkages 
between franchise ownership, performance and remuneration as 
independently contracted store managers do not necessarily have the same 
incentive to perform. The franchisees’ employee managers present the same 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems to the multi unit franchisee that 
the franchise arrangement was thought to solve for the franchisor.77 
Nevertheless, a substantial portion of the industry’s growth can be assigned 
to the rising popularity of multi unit franchising.78 Where franchisor executives 
often mention the high cost of finding high-quality franchisees, multi unit 
franchising can be seen as a means for franchisors to use efficiently their 
pool of high-quality franchisees.79
                                            
73 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
 The differences in the perspectives of the 
parties involved in franchising are less problematic in a system involving a 
franchisor and a multi unit franchisee than in a dyad built by a franchisor and 
a single unit franchisee. A multi unit franchisee has to undertake greater 
system-specific investments relative to a single unit franchisee. The results 
74 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 51 
75 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005), p. 52 
76 see Weaven and Herington (2007) 
77 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
78 see Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) 
79 see Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) 
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are a better alignment of franchisor-franchisee goals, especially those of 
maintaining brand name capital, and lower free riding probability of the multi 
unit franchisee. In multi unit franchising hired area managers are replaced by 
non-shirking agents (i.e., the multi unit franchisees) who do have residual 
claims. These multi unit franchisees have sustainable incentive both to 
pursue growth and to monitor the hired unit level managers closely. 
Consequently, multi unit franchising shifts the residual claim incentives one 
level up the hierarchy from the unit manager to the area manager.80
Most studies on franchising have concentrated on the traditional single unit 
model although a raising incident of multi unit franchising has been observed. 
This emphasis has been attributed to the difficulty in conceptualizing the 
theoretical framework underlying the use of multi unit franchising given moral 
hazard and adverse selection effects associated with the employment of unit 
level management.
  
81  
Previous research on franchisee-owned subsystems has not been able to 
bring its advantages down to a common denominator. Early studies resulted 
in findings that single unit operations outperformed multiple unit franchise 
systems. With ongoing research work later results suggest that multi unit 
franchising as governance structure was effective in supporting unit growth, 
reducing franchisee free riding behaviours and minimizing monitoring costs. 
Attempts to free-ride by some locations clearly hurt uniformity, but there are 
fewer incentives for free riding in multi unit franchising than there are in single 
unit franchising. When free riding occurs, a multiunit franchisee bears greater 
detrimental effects of the reduced quality on customer perceptions of the 
franchised brand than does a single unit franchisee and the chances that the 
franchisor would notice a lack of uniformity are higher in multi unit franchising 
than in single unit franchising. Thus, relative to a single unit franchisee, a 
multi unit franchisee faces both a greater downside risk of not maintaining 
uniformity and a greater probability of being caught with this misbehaviour.82
                                            
80 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
  
81 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
82 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
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The underlying hypothesis of the positive relationship between multi unit 
franchising and system growth appears to be that accelerated growth stands 
for rapid revenue increases for the franchisor, as each new franchise unit 
puts more royalties and fees to the franchisor’s account.83 Although from an 
agency theory view, multi unit franchising may have negative effects on 
growth, from the perspective of capital acquisition, its result may be positive. 
Multi unit operation offers potential synergies to franchisees. Franchisees 
anticipating expansion should accept lower capital returns than they might 
otherwise want to receive. Consequently, the increased access to capital 
should allow multi unit systems to grow faster. A previous study through fast-
food franchise systems and demonstrate that the more a chain engages in 
multi unit franchising, the faster it grows. When the system reaches a point of 
growth where the entrepreneur’s span of control is stretched beyond the 
numbers or contiguity of units that can be efficiently monitored, subsequent 
units are franchised.84 Franchisors that emphasize high growth are more 
likely to use multi unit rather than single unit franchising. Further, franchisors 
emphasizing uniformity instead of growth are more likely to use area 
development franchising. Processes and techniques necessary for system 
wide adaptation were found to be more easily adopted through multi unit 
franchisees than single unit operators.85 This is because multi unit franchising 
entails a smaller number of relationships to be coordinated.86 On the other 
hand chain franchisees were less likely to respond to local market 
conditions.87 Although multi unit franchising is less suitable for local 
responsiveness than single unit franchising, there exists some difference 
between area development franchising and incremental franchising in this 
regard. Given that the sub-systems started as a single unit in incremental 
franchising, the franchisee would have hands-on experience in the local 
market that an area development franchisee would lack.88
                                            
83 see Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) 
  
84 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
85 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
86 see Sanchez, Saurez and Vazquez (2006) 
87 see Weaven and Herington (2007) 
88 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
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Little consideration has been given to the role of firm-level influences upon a 
franchisor’s willingness to encourage multi unit franchising as growth 
strategy. A previous study conducted in the Australian franchise sector 
examines to what extent firm-level factors influence the growth of franchisee-
owned mini chains within Australian franchise systems. The decision 
variables used were based on age and size of the franchise system, 
franchise system corporatisation, franchising relationship conflict, among 
other things. The results supported the proposition that mature and larger 
franchise systems are more likely to apply multi unit franchising because in 
an early stage in their life cycle they did not possess the reputation 
necessary to attract as well as the skills to support suitable chain-franchisee 
candidates. Compared to their overseas counterparts chain franchisees of 
the Australian franchise sector seemed to be more reliant on their parent 
franchisors requiring guidance in marketing, promotion or new staff 
recruitment. This may be due to the smaller size of the franchise systems. 
Further, potential multiple unit franchisees showed to be less attracted to 
systems that are characterized by higher levels of intra-firm conflict.89 Limiting 
the number of single unit franchisees could lead to efficiency gains as 
empirical results reveal that multi unit franchisees necessitate less monitoring 
in light of decision-making independence. As a consequence, the intra-chain 
competition faced by each outlet would be reduced. This could be beneficial 
to performance outcome as franchisees tend to require less control when 
facing few competing outlets.90 In a second study, concerning the Australian 
market, multi unit franchising was described as a function that includes 
different parameters like agency costs, system uniformity, brand name value, 
geographical contiguity of subsystem units and system reward strategies.91
                                            
89 see Weaven and Frazer (2007a) 
 
Other research work took a closer look on the unit-level failure-reducing 
benefits of owner and franchisor experience. The argument was that benefits 
of experience reducing unit-level failure depend on whether that experience 
was gained locally or distantly from the unit in question. Franchisors prefer to 
rely on codified knowledge and standardized routines whereas franchisees 
90 see Cochet, Dormann and Ehrmann (2008) 
91 see Weaven and Frazer (2007b) 
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gather information that is idiosyncratic to a local market. The results indicate 
that a franchisee’s units benefit from their owner’s local congenital 
experience, but not from distantly gained experience. The study highlights 
the continued importance of local knowledge, even among the most codified 
and standardized business organizations.92 Franchisees bring to the 
franchise system knowledge of geographic locations and labour markets. 
Multi unit franchising can enable this local market knowledge to be fully 
exploited by the franchisee’s capacity to enable the transfer of knowledge 
from store to store within his mini chain. To do this in an effective manner, 
the outlets need to be located within the same locality which is not always the 
case as sometimes multi unit franchise agreements run across several 
states. Nevertheless, their experience and skills would be of value, and multi 
unit owners are likely to require less training and support from the 
franchisor.93
The conceptual model established by Weaven and Frazer (2003) to explain 
the use of multi unit franchising was based on issues of capital theory, 
resource constraints theory, agency theory, transaction cost economics and 
strategic motives theory. They defined nine variables which should give 
better insight into the widespread incidence of multi unit franchising. Four 
variables were defined as predictor variables for the use of multi unit 
franchising and other five variables should represent predicted outcomes due 
to the implementation of this franchising strategy. Franchisor experience, 
franchise system structure/corporatization and franchisee experience, as 
predictor variables, were expected to have a positive relationship with the 
use of multi unit franchising. Only the desire of franchisors for franchisee 
involvement at the store level, stated as hands-on involvement, was thought 
to have a negative relationship with the pursuit of multi unit franchising as a 
governance structure. On the other side, conflict, franchise system growth, 
contiguity, financial rewards and agency costs presented the predicted 
outcome variables. Agency costs indicated by the amount of monitoring costs 
and intra-firm conflict were hypothesized to have a negative relationship with 
 
                                            
92 see Kalnins and Mayer (2004) 
93 see Watson et al (2007) 
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the use of multi unit franchising. Whereas, franchise system growth, 
contiguity in close territories and financial rewards through granting additional 
units were proposed to have positive effect on using multi unit franchising.94
When it comes to allocating new units franchisors seem to prefer franchisees 
whose existing units and headquarters are geographically close to the new 
unit being established. Franchisors favour franchisees that run their existing 
units in markets with demographic characteristics which are similar to those 
of the planned new unit. A franchisor may follow the desire to specialize 
franchisees to territories with similar types of customers or more precisely 
pay attention to franchisees’ knowledge of specific types of markets. Another 
factor to bear in mind is the number of competitors that a franchisee faces 
around his current units. Many competitors reduce the likelihood that the 
franchisee will be assigned an additional unit, reflecting the idea that a 
franchisee’s work is more demanding in more competitive environments. This 
suggests that the benefits associated with the existence of clusters of units 
owned by a single franchisee must outweigh the cost that might arise from 
too less aggressive behaviour or increased bargaining power that franchisee 
owners of clusters of units might exert on their franchisors.
  
95 It should be 
noted that both the incentive of the multi unit franchisee to free ride and the 
problem of controlling outlet managers so they do not shirk are positively 
related to the dispersion of the outlets. Multi unit franchising reduces the 
potential for shirking when the outlets are geographically close because in 
this case it is less costly for the multi unit franchisee to control outlet 
managers because of scale economies in the control activity.96 The closer the 
outlets are owned by the same franchisee, the less incentive to free ride he 
has, because he would internalize a greater share of quality debasement 
costs to a greater extent than a single unit franchisee.97
                                            
94 see Weaven and Frazer (2003) 
 Multi unit franchising 
can be employed instead of single unit franchising to enhance organizational 
learning. The multi unit franchisee opening up another establishment may 
95 see Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004)  
96 see Sanchez, Saurez and Vazquez (2006) 
97 see Brickley (1999) 
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enjoy low risk of unit closure due to its specific experience functioning in the 
applicable industry niche.98
Multi unit franchising presents a favourable opportunity of expansion in the 
international context by providing the franchisor a greater ability to reduce 
opportunism than does international single unit franchising. The multi unit 
franchisor need to search for fewer franchisees and therefore economizes on 
recruiting, screening and training franchisees, especially in foreign markets. 
Further within multi unit franchising the task of recruiting unit level managers 
is delegated to the franchisee, whereas in single unit franchising this task is 
retained by the franchisor. It can be argued that because of both 
geographical and cultural proximity, the hazard of adverse selection of unit 
level managers would be less for the local multi unit franchisee than for the 
foreign franchisor. But not only adverse selection can be reduced by the use 
of multi unit franchising. Multi unit franchising in an international context 
outperforms single unit franchising in its capability to reduce shirking, 
inefficient risk bearing and free riding.
     
99
A recent research investigates the relationship between performance 
outcome, which is represented by the variables system termination and 
system litigation rates, and system structure. She argues that franchisee 
cheating through shirking and free riding can be mitigated by offering multi 
unit expansion opportunities to the franchisee and that termination and 
litigation rates will be lower as a consequence. She links ownership mix, self-
enforcing agreements and use of contractually-specified disciplinary devices 
to reduce exchange hazards. This happens by enhancing downstream rent 
potential for the franchisee, multi unit expansion opportunities act as the 
front-end of self-enforcing agreements, whereas, disciplinary advices form 
the back-end of the self-enforcing agreement mechanism. The probability 
that the available performance-related rents will be greater than the available 
cheating-related rents mitigates franchisee’s opportunistic behaviour. In a 
well-structured self-enforcing arrangement, the disciplinary “stick” should 
  
                                            
98 see Bates (1998) 
99 see Garg and Rasheed (2003) 
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have little use and the threat of discipline itself should be sufficient to ensure 
franchisee performance.100
Although the phenomenon of multi unit franchising has been investigated 
over the last two decades the academic literature on this topic is still in its 
“embryonic stage”.
  
101 The research deficit primarily emerges from the lack of 
theoretical foundation of this ownership strategy.102
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
As the previous section shows, a lot of different theories have been applied 
with the attempt to explain the emergence of multi unit franchising as the 
franchisor’s choice of ownership strategy. The results offered a wide range of 
answers and happened to be contradictive as well. Actual research work has 
not been able to fully answer the question why multi unit franchising has 
become so important over the last decades as a governance form. The main 
arguments for multi unit franchising have been faster system growth, higher 
firm survival when new franchising units are assigned to existing franchisees 
and the ability to overcome resource scarcity, financial and human capital, 
faced by the franchisor. Further arguments for the use of multi unit 
franchising are better motivated franchisees and therefore a reduction in 
monitoring tasks, due to the fact that a multi unit franchisee has less 
incentives to shirk or free ride because this would affect more severely his 
mini chain within the system and therefore his profitability.103
This paper is based on an integrative model for the franchisor’s choice of 
ownership strategy between single unit and multi unit franchising developed 
in the research work by Hussain and Windsperger (2010). Whilst a number of 
benefits are expected to ensue, it is unclear how franchisors determine 
whether multi unit franchising is appropriate for their business.
  
104
                                            
100 see Bercovitz (2003) 
 They built 
the theoretical framework on several organizational economics and strategic 
101 see Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) 
102 see Hussain and Windsperger (2010) 
103 see Hussain and Windsperger (2010) 
104 see Watson et al (2007) 
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management theories aimed at reducing the lack of theoretical foundation of 
this ownership strategy, given that previous research has been mostly upon 
the motivations behind the use of multi unit arrangements. Hypotheses were 
based on transaction cost view, agency theory, resourced based and 
organizational capabilities view, property rights theory and screening 
theory.105
Figure 2 Theoretical Framework 
 The present study that attempts to give a better insight to the 
question whether to use single unit franchising or multi unit franchising as 
ownership strategy relies upon agency theory and transaction cost theory 
explanations. Figure 2 summarizes the model contributing to this research 
work. 
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Source: Hussain, D and J. Windsperger (2010)  
5.1.1.  Agency Theory 
A motive to franchise, from an agency theory perspective, is to efficiently 
answer to motivational problems of geographically dispersed units.106
                                            
105 see Hussain and Windsperger (2010) 
 Multi 
unit franchising provides a mechanism to control free riding by the 
franchisee, provided that the units are geographically close. That is, 
franchisees will bear at least some of the costs if quality standards are not 
106 see Watson et al (2007) 
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enforced, as the lost customer is likely to fall on their own outlets.107 In 
addition, the closer the motivated multi unit franchisee is to the agent’s 
location, the lower the monitoring costs are expected to be.108 Consequently, 
where free riding is a particular concern to the franchisor, multi unit 
franchising may be preferred to other organisational forms. Another argument 
from an agency theory view could be that monitoring costs are delegated to 
franchisees, as they will take responsibility for monitoring and controlling 
manager behaviour.109 Therefore, more efficient control at the store level may 
be expected. Multi unit franchising is chosen when shirking-based monitoring 
costs are low and the level of free riding hazard is high. System uniformity as 
a crucial input to maintain brand name capital should lead to a higher use of 
multi unit franchising combined with lower incentives for free riding behaviour 
because the multi unit franchisee would bear greater detrimental effects by 
implementing reduced quality products.110 Researchers relying on the agency 
theory suggest that the franchising decision is motivated mostly by 
advantages gained through superior service and operational performance 
than by the desire to acquire capital through expansion. To be able to 
achieve these advantages a significant brand value or uniform product quality 
may be a criteria. Franchisors prefer granting multiple unit agreements to 
franchisees that have demonstrated successfully to be capable to handle 
single unit operations in the system. Therefore, a multi unit franchising 
strategy should reduce the costs associated with continuing store-level 
monitoring.111
H1: The franchisor’s propensity toward multi unit franchising is   
positively related with the franchisee’s behavioral uncertainty, due to 
shirking. 
 Franchisors should choose the use of multi unit franchising 
compared to single unit franchising because it helps to mitigate agency 
problems by creating a stronger incentive system for the franchisees. We can 
derive the following hypotheses: 
                                            
107 see Sanchez, Saurez and Vazquez (2006) 
108 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
109 see Watson et al (2007) 
110 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
111 see Weaven and Frazer (2007b) 
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H2: The franchisor’s propensity toward multi unit franchising is 
positively related with the franchisee’s behavioral uncertainty, due to 
free riding. 
5.1.2.  Transaction Cost Theory 
Williamson (1985) detects transaction specific investments and 
environmental uncertainty as the major influencing factors of governance 
mechanism. Franchisors expect franchisees to undertake significant 
commitments like investments in outlet- specific assets. This outlet specificity 
of assets bonds the franchisee to the franchising contract and offers the 
franchisor a source of leverage to ensure ongoing cooperations from 
franchisees.112 As a multi unit franchisee these specific investements are 
typically higher than in a single unit franchising agreement and therefore 
have a higher bonding effect and consequently a higher impact on the 
franchisee’s motivation to act cooperatively.113 Especially for area 
development franchisees, the threat of the loss of upfront investments and 
future revenue streams for underperformers provides a clear incentive to act 
properly.114 In this way a franchise contract may be designed to ensure a self-
enforcement mechanism. Self-enforcement describes a situation in which the 
franchise contract creates sufficient rents for the franchisee which motivate 
him, combined with the threat of contract termination, to perform. This future 
expected premium stream for the franchisee has to be equal to or greater 
than the short-run gains obtained by a franchisee’s opportunistic behaviour.115 
If franchisees obtain multi unit opportunities the self-enforcement mechanism 
will be even stronger and franchisors will be less forced to employ 
disciplinary devices like system termination.116
  
 The higher the bonding effect 
of the franchisee’s specific investments under multi unit franchising 
compared to single unit franchising, the higher is the propensity to implement 
multi unit franchising.  
                                            
112 see Combs and Ketchen (1999) 
113 see Hussain and Windsperger (2010) 
114 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005)  
115 see Klein (1995) 
116 see Bercovitz (2003) 
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H3: Franchisee’s specific investments are positively related with the                                                       
franchisor’s tendency to the use of multi unit franchising. 
 Environmental uncertainty reflects the difficulty faced by the firm to predict 
relevant contingencies. Under single unit franchising, the franchisee likely will 
have a more suitable combination of knowledge and incentives to be 
responsive to variations in customer requirements than will a hired store level 
manager in multi unit franchising. Further, responsiveness to variations in 
customer requirements implies a low degree of programmability.117 Following, 
the more local market knowledge has to be assessed the lower will be the 
tendency toward multi unit franchising.118
H4: Environmental uncertainty is negatively related with the 
franchisor’s tendency toward multi unit franchising. 
 
 
5.2. Methods 
5.2.1.  Data Sources 
The data collected was obtained by distributing a questionnaire to the 
franchise systems established in Germany. To support the study the 
Deutscher Franchise Verband (German Franchise Association) provided the 
actual “Verzeichnis der Franchise-Wirtschaft 2009/2010” (Register of the 
Franchise Economy). This register contains all the relevant information of 
about 1000 franchise systems operating in Germany. The franchisor 
information includes: company name, year established, address, contact 
person, telephone and fax numbers, short description of business, number of 
franchised units, number of company-owned units, capital requirements for a 
franchise (including cash investment, total investment, and minimum net 
worth), fee structure (including initial fee, royalty, and advertising fee). A first 
screening of the data was undertaken by selecting franchisors that stated full 
information about contact person, preferably the managing director, contact 
address, number of franchised and company-owned outlets and the year 
                                            
117 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
118 see Hussain and Windsperger (2010) 
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when they started to franchise. Each mailing included the questionnaire as 
well as a cover letter describing the purpose of the study and guaranteeing 
anonymity to participants. We divided the questionnaire in two parts. Part A 
was designed to get detailed information about the ownership strategy the 
franchisor is pursuing. Therefore we used a seven-point Likert Scale to 
measure the survey items (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). In Part 
B we asked for general information about the franchise business, like number 
of years in business, amount of initial investments, number of franchised 
outlets, advertising fees, the amount of training days for the franchisees per 
year. Franchisors had the possibility to answer the questionnaire and send it 
back per mail or they could fill in an online version. 
5.2.2.  Sample 
A total of 491 franchisors were selected. About three weeks after the first 
mailing a remainder by telephone was started where we tried to directly 
contact the managing directors to kindly ask them to fill in the questionnaire. 
In a third step the systems we haven’t got any answer yet were contacted via 
an email remainder including the questionnaire and the link to the online 
version. Overall, 136 actual responses were received, yielding a response 
rate of 27.7 percent. Out of the 136 actual responses, 111 were included to 
test the hypotheses. The rest of the cases could not be used because some 
required data were missing. In the study we included franchise systems 
related to the service, production and sales sector. On average, the 
franchisors participating in this study established their business in 1998, with 
an average of 11 years in franchising and required a total investment of 
€450.000 and an advertising fee of 0.9% of sales. The year of establishment 
ranged from 1976 to 2009. System size ranged from 2 up to 2520 units with 
an average number of 157 outlets per franchisor. The average number of 
franchisees contracted by a franchisor was about 96 franchisees in the year 
2010. A summary of descriptive statistics over the whole sample are found in 
Table 2. 
  
 
 
Page 32 of 54 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Sample (Germany) 
Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Number of company 
owned outlets in Germany 
in  2010
0 700 32,15 95.994
Number of franchised 
outlets in Germany in 
2010
1 2,500 124.39 303.114
Number of franchisees in 
In Germany 2010
1 2,300 96.23 271.586
Year when first franchised 
outlet was opened in 
Germany
1976 2009 1998 8.391
Franchise/entry fee in 
Euro 
0 100,000 12,668.57 14,701.979
Average investment 
(excluding fanchise/entry 
fee) required by a 
franchisee to start a new 
franchised outlet (Euro)
100 38,500,000 452,263.79 3,571,217.354
Variable advertising / 
marketing fee (% of sales) 
0 6 0.9369 134.477
Franchise contract length 
in years
1 20 6.85 3.285
Number of Years in 
franchising
1 34 11.19 8.391
Company owned and 
franchised outlets
2 2,520 157.17 329.516
 
5.2.3. Dependent Variable 
The object of this study is to understand the franchisor’s choice of ownership 
strategy between single unit and multi unit franchising. Multi unit franchising 
is ubiquitous although it separates ownership from local decision making and 
seems to be inefficient in theoretical aspects. The underlying premise of this 
research work is that the franchisor will be able to develop advantages in 
reducing monitoring costs and to successfully bond the franchisee to the 
franchise contract if he prefers to use multi unit franchising over single unit 
franchising. To measure the intensity of use of multi unit franchising the 
dependent variable was defined as the franchised units divided by the 
number of franchisees.  
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5.2.4. Independent Variables 
After the surveys had been returned, a first step in processing the data was 
to perform analyses of the scales. A factor analysis with oblimin rotations was 
conducted to assess the internal consistency of the scales that measures the 
range of each construct and to purify the scales. Oblimin rotations were 
chosen because they allow items to be correlated. To assess the reliability of 
the extracted factors a reliability analysis was performed with Cronbach’s 
alpha used as the determinant.  
Shirking and Free riding 
Shirking and free riding are stated as the main predictors in agency theory 
arguments and the associated problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Shirking, thereby, represents the threat of suboptimal effort in the 
franchise agreement through the franchisee. The franchisee may have the 
intention to use low quality inputs to save on costs and increase his profits. 
Two separate questionnaire items were constructed to get insight in the 
franchisor’s perception of this problem. Franchisors were asked to specify 
how difficult it is to assess the franchisees capabilities and to measure its 
performance at the outlet level.  
If the franchisor’s brand name is of high value the franchisor faces the threat 
that his franchisees free-ride on this strong brand name. They are unlikely to 
lose sales if other units follow through with obligations. They can benefit from 
spill over effects of other hard working franchisees. Franchisors were asked 
to indicate how important their brand name is compared to their competitors. 
The results of a principal component factor analysis revealed all items for 
shirking and free riding to load highly on one common factor each. A 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.778 on the shirking factor and a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.761 on the free riding factor provided support for the reliability of the scale.  
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Environmental Uncertainty and Specific Investment 
Three items on the questionnaire measured the importance of environmental 
uncertainty on the franchisor’s decision to implement multi unit franchising as 
a ownership strategy. Franchisors were asked to indicate the level of their 
agreement with three statements – “The sale at the outlet level is very 
fluctuating”; “It’s very difficult to predict the market development at the output 
level”; “The economic environment in the local market is changing rapidly”. 
All of these items measure the volatility dimension of environmental 
uncertainty, as the extent to how rapid the environment changes and makes 
it difficult to predict future outcomes. After the factor analysis a reliability 
analysis was performed. This analysis showed that reliability can be 
improved if the item “The economic environment in the local market is 
changing rapidly” was deleted as it resulted in a substantially greater value in 
α than the overall α.  
To measure specific investments as a bonding mechanism of the franchisee 
to the franchise contract the franchisors were asked to indicate to what extent 
franchisees have to bear asset specific investments at the start of contract. 
The items highly loaded on one common factor each. The reliability analysis 
resulted in an overall Cronbach alpha of 0.817 for the factor of environmental 
uncertainty and an overall Cronbach alpha of 0.783 for specific investments 
respectively. Table 3 summarizes the factor matrix for the independent 
variables. 
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Table 3 Factor Matrix 
 
Components 
1 2 3 4 
Our franchise system enjoys 
higher brand recognition as 
compared to our comeptitors 
0.855    
Our brand name is very strong 
as compared to our competitors 
0.847    
Our brand name is very 
important for achieving 
competitive advantage 
0.767    
It is very difficult to predict the 
market development at the 
outlet level 
 0.919   
The sales at the outlet level is 
very fluctuating  
 0.918   
It is very difficult to measure the 
performance of the outlet 
manager (franchisee or 
manager). 
  -0.902  
It is very difficult to assess the 
competencies and capabilities of 
the outlet manager (franchisee 
or manager). 
  -0.902  
To what extent the franchisee 
bears  --expenses for technical 
and orgnizational support by the 
franchisor at the start of contract 
   -0.906 
-- expenses for training at the 
beginning of the contract 
   -0.893 
Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser-
Normalisation. Four factors extracted (eigenvalues >1); Kayser-Meyer-Olkin-criterion: 
0.573 Bartlett’s test of spherity: Ch²=333.469, df=36, p<.001. Absolute values less than 
0.4 were suppressed. 
 
5.2.5. Control Variables 
Two control variables have been included in the regression analysis: the 
system size and age of the system. I controlled for system size as different 
previous research work argued that multi unit franchising is preferable for 
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rapid system growth and that franchising as an organisational form will have 
a positive consequence on a firm’s survival because it allows a faster 
development of economies of scale and thereby higher competitiveness. 
Further it represents an efficient method for firms to acquire capital. A firm’s 
emphasis on franchising used as expansion strategy has a significant, 
positive effect on its growth and survival.119 Franchisors should prefer multi 
unit franchising because it affords more capital for growth than does single 
unit franchising. An underpinning study through fast-food franchise systems 
in Texas demonstrated that the more a chain engages in multi unit 
franchising, the faster it grows.120
 The control variable system size was constructed as the total sum of the 
number of company-owned outlets and franchised outlets by the franchisor. I 
included both types of outlets in the size variable as most often franchise 
networks are characterised by hybridized organizational arrangements and 
plural forms, the simultaneous use of franchised and company owned units. 
An explanation for the usage may be their ability to balance the competing 
demands of system standardization and system-wide adaptation to 
competition. 
 
The variable age of system was defined as the number of years operating in 
franchising. Previous research supported the proposition that mature and 
larger franchise systems are more likely to apply multi unit franchising 
because in an early stage in their life cycle they did not possess the 
reputation necessary to attract as well as the skills to support suitable chain-
franchisee candidates.121
 
 The variable was computed as the difference 
between the actual year in franchising, the year 2010, and the date the first 
franchise was established. 
 
 
                                            
119 see Shane (1996) 
120 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996)  
121 see Weaven and Frazer (2007)  
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5.2.6. Results 
The hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression to estimate the 
following model: 
 Yi = (b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + … + b6X6) + εi 
Y is the outcome variable, b1 is the coefficient of the first predictor (X1), b2 is 
the coefficient of the second predictor (X2), and so on, and εi is the difference 
between the predicted and the observed value of Y for the ith participant. 
Variables x1 and x2 were the agency variables, represented by shirking and 
free riding, entered in the first hierarchical step. Variables x3 and x4 stand for 
the transaction cost variables environmental uncertainty and specific 
investments which were entered in the second hierarchical step. The control 
variables age of the system, x5, and size of the system, x6, followed in the 
third hierarchical step of analysis. The hypotheses test is related to the full 
model, which was analyzed in the third step of the hierarchical process, while 
the first two models enable an insight on the relative importance of the 
agency and transaction cost variables. In Table 4 the means, standard 
deviations, and correlations of the variables are listed. A bivariate Pearson 
correlation was computed. A negative and highly significant correlation (r = -
0.345, p < 0.01) between environmental uncertainty and the use of multi unit 
franchising can be observed, providing preliminary evidence for H4. 
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Table 4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Descriptive Statisticsc 
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) MU Intensity 1.487 103.159 1
(2) REGR factor score   1 
for analysis 4 
Environment 
0.0120327 102.053.703 -0.345** 1
(3) REGR factor score   2 
for analysis 4 Investment 0.0457395 0.98537217 0.237* 0.03 1
(4) REGR factor score   2 
for analysis 8 Shirking 
-0.0018484 102.212.333 0.243** -0.014 0.187* 1
(5) REGR factor score   3 
for analysis 8 freeriding -0.0048413 0.98902426 0.259** -0.142 0.157 0.106 1
(6) Number of Years in 
Franchising
Nov.22 8.496 0.304** -0.014 0.02 0.126 0.159 1
(7) Company owned and 
franchised outlets
149.14 327.469 0.107 0.007 -0.073 0.05 -0.132 0.453** 1
 
 
  
**.  p < 0,01 (two-tailed) 
*.  p < 0,05 (two-tailed) 
c. N = 111 
 
The variable age of the system ranged from 1 to 34 years with a mean of 
11.2 years. The franchisor’s spread of size encompassed from 1 up to 2520 
units, with a mean of 149 units per franchisor. Compared to more 
established franchise systems, like in the U. S., the sample of Germany’s 
franchisors contains a high number of relatively young and small firms.  
The results of regression are presented in Table 5 – 7. Model 1 included only 
the agency variables, the transaction cost variables were implemented in 
Model 2 and in Model 3 the control variables were considered. 
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Table 5 Regression Results 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1.473 0.093 15.803 0,000
REGR factor score   2 for analysis 8 
Shirking x
0.23 0.092 0.227 2.502 0.014
REGR factor score   3 for analysis 8 
free-riding x
0.243 0.095 0.233 2.56 0.012
(Constant) 1.478 0.087 17.072 0,000
REGR factor score   2 for analysis 8 
Shirking x
0.176 0.088 0.174 2.009 0.047
REGR factor score   3 for analysis 8 
free-riding x
0.16 0.09 0.153 1.768 0.08
REGR factor score   1 for analysis 4 
Environment x
-0.335 0.086 -0.332 -3.884 0,000
REGR factor score   2 for analysis 4 
Investment x
0.218 0.092 0.209 2.373 0.019
(Constant) 1.146 0.141 8.116 0,000
REGR factor score   2 for analysis 8 
Shirking x
0.147 0.085 0.146 1.726 0.087
REGR factor score   3 for analysis 8 
free-riding x
0.133 0.09 0.127 1.475 0.143
REGR factor score   1 for analysis 4 
Environment x
-0.33 0.084 -0.327 -3.951 0,000
REGR factor score   2 for analysis 4 
Investment x
0.22 0.089 0.211 2.469 0.015
Number of Years in Franchising 0.028 0.012 0.233 2.447 0.016
Company owned and franchised 
outlets
0,000 0,000 0.033 0.347 0.73
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Sig.
3
2
Model T
1
 
Table 6 ANOVAd 
 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 13.129 2 6.565 6.822 0.002
2 Regression 29.096 4 7.274 8.765 0,000
3 Regression 36.259 6 6.043 7.778 0,000
Model
 d. Dependent Variable: MU Intensity 
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Table 7 Model Summaryd 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 0.335a 0.112 0.096 0.112 6.822 2 108 0.002
2 0.499b 0.249 0.22 0.136 9.620 2 106 0,000
3 0.557c 0.31 0.27 0.061 4.609 2 104 0.012
Model R R-Square
Adjusted 
R-Square
Change Statistics
 
 
Model 1 regressed the factors of shirking and free riding on the use of multi 
unit franchising. The estimation is found to be highly significant (R² = 0.112, p 
< 0.01) explaining 11.2 percentage of variance in the data. Model 2 likewise 
turned out to be significant. With an adjusted R² of 0.22, explanatory power of 
Model 2 was high (p < 0.001). Compared to the Model 1, Model 2 added 13.6 
percentage points to the explanation of variance in the data. Model 3 
contained all independent variables and control variables and could 
strengthen the estimate. The result was able to explain 31 percent of 
variance in the use of multi unit franchising with Model 3 adding 6.1 further 
percentage points to the variance explanation, being significant at p < 0.05.  
For the hypotheses a mixed support was received. Hypotheses 1 and 2 
which are dealing with agency matters supposed a positive relationship 
between use of multi unit franchising as ownership strategy and franchisee’s 
behavioural uncertainty, due to shirking and free riding. The assumption 
underlying this theory is based on the realisation of lower monitoring costs at 
the store level because of the multi unit franchisee’s motivation to keep 
quality high and avoid suboptimal effort to circumvent detrimental effects on 
his mini chain within the system due to moral hazard. The relationship turned 
out to be positive, as expected, but without being highly significant. 
Hypothesis 2, that the franchisor’s propensity toward Multi Unit Franchising is 
positively related with the franchisee’s behavioural uncertainty, due to free 
a. Predictor: (Constant), REGR factor score   3 for analysis 8 freeriding x, REGR factor score   2 for 
analysis 8 Shirking x 
b. Predictor: (Constant), REGR factor score   3 for analysis 8 freeriding x, REGR factor score   2 for 
analysis 8 Shirking x, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 4 Environment x, REGR factor score   2 for 
analysis 4 Investment x 
c. Predictor: (Constant), REGR factor score   3 for analysis 8 freeriding x, REGR factor score   2 for 
analysis 8 Shirking x, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 4 Environment x, REGR factor score   2 for 
analysis 4 Investment x, Company owned and franchised outlets, Number of Years in Franchising 
d. Dependent Variable: MU Intensity 
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riding, was not supported. Model 3 displayed a positive relationship (b = 
0.147) and marginally significant coefficient (p < 0.10) of the interaction term 
between multi unit ownership and shirking. Hence, agency hypotheses were 
weakly supported by the data. 
Hypothesis 3 supposed that franchisee’s specific investments are positively 
related with the franchisor’s tendency to the use of multi unit franchising. The 
data lent support to this assumption that specific investments act as a 
bonding mechanism in the franchise relationship and are even more 
significant in multi unit agreements. The coefficient in the final results was 
positive (b = 0.220) and statistically significant (p < 0.05).  
Hypothesis 4 predicted a negative relationship between the intention to use 
multi unit franchising as a governance form and the environmental 
uncertainty of the local market due to unpredictable events and rapid 
changes. Indeed, Model 3 revealed a negative coefficient (b = -0.330) that 
was statistically significant (p < 0.001). H4 was therefore supported and the 
data generated a strong support to the transaction cost based explanations 
for the franchisor’s tendency to the use of multi unit franchising. 
6. Discussion 
The concern of the study is to research and better understand the 
franchisor’s choice of ownership strategy between single unit and multi unit 
franchising. This study represents empirical evidence from the German 
franchise sector to cover this question. The results of the study yielded mixed 
support of the hypotheses stated, relying strongly on transaction cost based 
arguments. Specific investments undertaken by the franchisee at the 
beginning of the contract have a strong ex-post bonding mechanism which 
matches with previous research work. Asset specific investments become 
useless in alternative relationships and make it therefore difficult to switch to 
a different contract partner. Klein (1995) describes the franchise contract as a 
means to facilitate a self-enforcing mechanism. “… The threat of termination 
of the relationship by the franchisor gives the franchisee sufficient incentive 
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to supply the desired behaviour.”122 The potential opportunity for the 
franchisee to operate a mini chain of multi units even enforces this bonding 
mechanism. As a multi unit franchisee he has to make higher investment 
compared to a single unit franchisee. The termination of the contract depicts 
a greater threat to lose the future premium streams to get remunerated for 
the upfront investments.123 Therefore, franchisors should prefer the use of 
multi unit franchising which can be confirmed by the data. The different 
aspects of uncertainty a franchisor has to bear are presented by behavioural 
uncertainty of the franchisee and environmental uncertainty of the local 
market. Behavioural uncertainty will be discussed later on in combination with 
agency problems emerging in the franchise relationship. According to 
Williamson (1985) transaction specific investments and environmental 
uncertainty are the major factors influencing governance mechanisms. 
Belonging to the fact that multi unit franchisees represent an additional layer 
in management and that their stores are run by employed managers they are 
supposed to be less capable in local market responsiveness than single unit 
franchisors.124
Surprisingly, in contrast with previous studies, the data lent only weak 
support for the agency based hypotheses. Shirking arguments as well as the 
threat of free riding did not seem to have a strong impact on the franchisor’s 
preference to use multi unit franchising over single unit franchising. This 
rather supports the assumption that multi unit franchising represents a 
curious anomaly in the incentive-based rationale of agency theory.
 The results of the study supported previous research work 
displaying the preference of German franchisors to use single unit franchising 
to multi unit franchising when high environmental uncertainty is faced.  
125
                                            
122 see Klein (1995) 
 In spite 
of its apparently conflicting performance outcome multi unit franchising is 
ubiquitous in mature franchise systems like in the U.S.. The main arguments 
based on agency theory are that multi unit franchising reduced opportunistic 
behaviour by the franchisee because it better aligns the interests of 
franchisor and franchisee. A multi unit franchisee would rather harm his own 
123 see Bercovitz (2003)  
124 see Weaven and Frazer (2007b) 
125 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996) 
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mini chain than profit from spill over effects of well-behaving other 
franchisees when free riding on the franchisor’s brand name.  A possible 
explanation of the little use of multi unit franchising in agency theory aspects 
might be that the German franchise sector is relatively young. The descriptive 
statistics of the data showed that the average part of franchise systems was 
established in 1998 and had an average lifetime of 11 years. The oldest 
systems in the data encompassed 34 years of performance. In comparison, 
franchising in the U.S. has a tradition that goes back to the mid 1800s.126 
Multi unit franchising emerged in the 1980s. Given the fact that franchising in 
Germany is relatively young franchisors may have not been able to establish 
strong brand names yet.127 Therefore, a franchisee’s incentive to free-ride 
may be negligible and the franchisor’s propensity to use multi unit franchising 
not statistically ascertained. Suggestions have been developed that multi unit 
franchising may be used by larger systems for which managing a large 
number of individual franchise relationships becomes less efficient. This 
would lead to the assumption that single unit franchising is seen as the 
preferred form, until some minimum scale is reached.128 This might be a 
further explanation for the weak support of the agency hypotheses in the 
study. One has also to keep in mind Germany’s dismissal protection act. The 
low threshold at which the dismissal protection provisions become applicable 
acts as a brake on the development of franchise systems and may explain 
the lower use of multi unit franchising.129
This study is not without limitations. It used cross-sectional data instead of 
panel data to explain the tendency of franchisors to use multi unit franchising 
as ownership strategy. Further the research question did not pay attention to 
the different forms of multi unit franchising. It was viewed as a one-
dimensional construct. Future research should consider the different types of 
multi unit franchising like area development multi unit franchising or 
 At least in the threat of shirking multi 
unit franchising could obtain a marginal significance as a possible and cost 
effective countermeasure.   
                                            
126 see Blair and Lafontaine (2005) 
127 see Weaven and Frazer (2007b) 
128 See Watson et al (2007) 
129 see Deutsche Bank Research (2008)  
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sequential multi unit franchising and its effects on the application to differing 
market situations. Although multi unit franchising is assumed to be less 
effective to respond to local market specificities there may lay a significant 
difference in the use of area development agreements or sequential multi unit 
franchising. An incremental franchisee would likely emphasize the 
importance of local responsiveness in the subsequent monitoring of hired, 
unit-level managers as he has observed its role in the success of the 
franchise early on, started as a single unit franchisee.130
This study collected data from franchise systems in Germany without paying 
special attention to the sectors the system is operating in. Franchisors were 
only asked to indicate their type of franchising, whether it was product, 
sales/distribution or service franchising. The sector as a dummy variable 
entered in the regression analysis did not yield any significant difference in 
the result. Other researchers argue that multi unit franchising may be more 
prevalent in those sectors which are characterized by more transient 
customers giving a higher incentive to the franchisee to shirk on quality of 
inputs.
 Given the strong 
support in the data of this study considering the negative relationship of 
environmental uncertainty on the use of multi unit franchising this research 
question might be of special interest. 
131 A recent study tested if multi unit franchising was more likely used 
in the service industry and found a significant and positive relationship.132
  
 It 
would be interesting to test if this assumption is likewise applicable to the 
German franchise industry and therefore may be able to provide better 
insights on franchisor’s tendency to use multi unit franchising. 
                                            
130 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005)  
131 see Watson et al (2007) 
132 see Sanchez et al (2006)  
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7. Conclusion 
This study offers agency theory and transaction cost theory explanations for 
multi unit franchising as a governance form used in Germany’s franchise 
industry. The arguments underlying the research question were that multi unit 
franchising should be the preferred ownership strategy as it has a higher 
ability to bond franchisees to the franchise contract, to align franchisors’ and 
franchisees’ incentives and consequently reduce the expenses in monitoring 
costs. Therefore a questionnaire was mailed to nearly 500 franchisors to 
collect the data and the empirical results were presented in this paper. The 
findings corroborated outcomes of prior transaction cost theory research with 
regard to the positive influence of asset specific investments as an ex post 
bonding mechanism. Environmental uncertainty was strongly supported by 
the data but in having a negative relationship with the implementation of multi 
unit franchising as ownership strategy. However, I indicated the lack of 
diversifying the different forms of multi unit franchising and their varying 
potential to respond to local market idiosyncrasies.  
The study revealed that franchisors did not see a strong relationship between 
the use of multi unit franchising and its efficiency in mitigating moral hazard. 
Free riding could not establish any statistical support at all and the threat of 
shirking was perceived only marginally important. Previous research work 
showed that franchise systems grow faster the more they rely on multi unit 
franchising.133 A frequent use of multi unit franchising should therefore result 
in high growth.134
                                            
133 see Kaufmann and Dant (1996)  
 System size was included in the analysis as control variable 
but did not present any importance on the franchisor’s choice of ownership 
strategy. Capital scarcity has been among the first arguments to use 
franchising to circumvent this short come and enable system growth. 
Consequently, future research work may choose a direct exploration of this 
question and its effects related to multi unit franchising in the German 
franchise sector. However, the number of years the system already has 
experience in franchising revealed a positive relationship with multi unit 
franchising and its use. This would be consistent with previous 
134 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
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argumentations that mature firms are more likely to apply multi unit 
franchising as they possess the experience and reputation necessary to build 
a multi unit system.135
This study is an attempt to give insight into the phenomenon of multi unit 
franchising off the well established franchise systems in the United States. 
Transaction cost arguments and the strength of self-enforcement through 
multi unit franchising found strong support in the data.  
         
Referring to the statement, “…franchisors pursuing different priorities face 
different agency problems with their franchisees, and these agency problems 
drive the decision concerning organization form”136
  
, I would suggest that for 
franchising in Germany further research work has to be undertaken on 
agency problems and how they can effectively be addressed by multi unit 
franchising, paying attention to its different strategies of new unit allocation.  
                                            
135 see Weaven and Frazer (2007a) 
136 see Garg, Rasheed and Priem (2005) 
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9. Appendix 
9.1. Summary 
Since the 1980s major importance in the growth of franchising systems can 
be attributed to the advent of a new governance form due to multi unit 
franchising. In a multi unit agreement a franchisee is permitted the right to 
establish a mini chain of outlets within the franchise system. Three distinct 
types of multi unit franchising have been categorised by researchers, namely, 
master franchising (or sub franchising), area development and area 
representative (sequential multi unit franchising) agreements. This work tries 
to explain the situation and use of multi unit franchising in the German 
franchise sector which is quite young compared to the U.S. market.   
Premises to explain the use of this ownership strategy are based on agency 
theory and transaction cost theory. The hypotheses formulated suggest that 
behavioural uncertainty through the franchisee, because of shirking and free 
riding, should have a positive relationship with the tendency to the use of 
multi unit franchising. A likewise positive relationship should be established 
due to specific investments by the franchisee at start of the contract. 
However, environmental uncertainty, because of rapid changing markets, 
should reduce the tendency to the use of multi unit franchising.   
The study revealed that franchisors did not see a strong relationship between 
the use of multi unit franchising and its efficiency in mitigating moral hazard. 
The findings corroborated outcomes of prior transaction cost theory research 
with regard to the positive influence of asset specific investments as an ex 
post bonding mechanism. Environmental uncertainty was strongly supported 
by the data but in having a negative relationship with the implementation of 
multi unit franchising as ownership strategy. Mixed support of the hypotheses 
was obtained.  
Limitations of the study, like the use of cross-sectional data and not paying 
attention to different types of multi unit franchising, make it necessary to 
further explore this research question to get a better understanding of 
franchising in Germany and its application to different requirements. 
 
 
Page 53 of 54 
 
 
9.2. Zusammenfassung 
Im Laufe der letzten drei Jahrzehnte konnte der Unternehmensform Multi 
Unit Franchising eine immer größere Bedeutung für das rasche Wachstum 
der Franchise-Systeme zugeschrieben werden. In einem Multi-Unit 
Franchising Vertrag hat der Franchisenehmer das Recht eine Mini-Kette an 
Filialen innerhalb des Franchise-Systems zu etablieren. Es gibt drei 
verschiedene Arten dieses Multi Unit Franchising aufzubauen. Dabei werden 
Master Franchising (oder Sub Franchising), Area Development Multi Unit 
Franchising und Sequential Multi Unit Franchising unterschieden. Diese 
Arbeit versucht, die Situation und die Verwendung von Multi Unit Franchising 
in der deutschen Franchise-Branche zu erklären, die im Vergleich zur 
Situation am US-Markt noch sehr jung ist.  
Die Untersuchung und ihre Fragestellung basieren auf Argumenten der 
Agency-Theorie und Transaktionskostentheorie. Die Hypothesen, die im 
Zuge der statistischen Aufbereitung der Daten formuliert wurden, spiegeln 
die Annahme, dass Verhaltensunsicherheit durch den Franchisenehmer, 
aufgrund von „Drückebergerei“ und der Situation des „Trittbrettfahrens“, in 
einer positiven Beziehung mit dem vermehrten Einsatz von Multi Unit 
Franchising stehen. Ein ebenfalls positives Verhältnis sollte durch spezifische 
Investitionen durch den Franchisenehmer bei Beginn des Vertrages 
festgelegt werden. Allerdings sollte die Unsicherheit der Umwelt, aufgrund 
rasch wandelnder Märkte, den Einsatz von Multi Unit Franchising mindern. 
Die Ergebnisse lieferten eine gemischte Bestätigung der Hypothesen. Die 
Einflüsse durch Unsicherheiten in der Umwelt und spezifische Investitionen 
erwiesen sich durch die Daten als signifikant belegt. Allerdings konnte diese 
statische Beziehung in ihrer Signifikanz nicht für die agency-theoretischen 
Aspekte nachgewiesen werden. In der Aussagekraft der Studie  ergeben sich 
Einschränkungen durch die Verwendung von Querschnittsdaten und die 
Vernachlässigung der unterschiedlichen Formen von Multi Unit Franchising 
mit Ihren Vor- und Nachteilen. 
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